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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Edward Ray Christensen appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence found in a search of his home. In the district court, he asserted that, 
when his parole officer and other law enforcement officers entered his home and began 
questioning him, he should have been advised as to his Miranda 1 rights. When the 
district court denied the motion, Mr. Christensen entered a conditional plea of guilty to 
one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, preserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Mr. Christensen asserts that the 
d court erred it denied his to 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Christensen was on parole. (R., p.86.) And, on July 18, 2012, Julie 
Guiberson, Mr. Christensen's parole officer, went to Mr. Christensen's home to "do a 
home visit and to check if he was doing any illegal activities" because she said her 
office had received anonymous phone calls claiming that Mr. Christensen was dealing 
methamphetamine. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.13, L.23 - p.24, L.6.) Before she arrived, she called 
for backup. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.16, Ls.3-11.) Shortly thereafter, four Idaho State Police 
officers joined Ms. Guiberson at the home: Trooper Skinner, Detective Olson, Detective 
Donohue, and Sergeant Kapf. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.27, Ls.3-4.) Before any of them entered 
the home or spoke with Mr. Christensen, a woman came out of the home. (Tr. 4/2/13, 
p.21, Ls.12-16.) Detective Skinner approached the woman and spoke with her briefly 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
1 
while Ms. Guiberson knocked on the door. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.2·1, Ls.16-·18.) The woman did 
not provide any information as to why she had been at the residence. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.21, 
L.20 - p.22, L.16.) 
While Detective Skinner spoke with the woman, Mr. Christensen let 
Ms. Guiberson into the home, and Detective Skinner and Detective Olson followed her 
in immediately thereafter. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.22, L.17, p.44, Ls.13-16, p.47, Ls.14-18.) 
Without advising him of his Miranda rights, Ms. Guiberson told Mr. Christensen why 
they were there and also falsely told him that the woman who had just departed said 
she had purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Christensen. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.22, Ls.17-
25 - p.23, Ls.1-8.) When asked at the suppression hearing whether this was true, 
Ms. Guiberson said "No. That was an interview tactic." (Tr. 4/2/13, p.23, Ls.1-2.) She 
also acknowledged that the purpose of making that statement was to get 
Mr. Christensen to admit that he had sold methamphetamine. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.23, Ls.9-
13.) Ms. Guiberson said that Mr. Christensen admitted then that he had sold the 
woman methamphetamine. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.22, L.22.) 
At that point, Ms. Guiberson said she told Mr. Christensen that if he wanted to be 
upfront and honest, she would give him a chance to talk, because he could be "looking 
at a delivery charge" or a "simple possession charge." (Tr. 4/2/13, p.23, Ls.15-19.) She 
told him "If you want to speak with us, then you have an option of being charged with 
just possession if there's anything in the home." (Tr. 4/2/13, p.23, Ls.19-21.) Faced 
with this option, Mr. Christensen agreed to speak with them. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.23, Ls.21-
22.) Ms. Guiberson explained that she and Trooper Skinner asked Mr. Christensen if 
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he had anything illegal in the home, and he said he had methamphetamine under the 
couch, which they immediately found. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.24, L.22 - p.25, L.2.) 
Ms. Guiberson testified that the encounter took approximately 45 minutes to an 
hour. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.29, Ls.15-21.) When asked whether Mr. Christensen was free to 
leave during that time, Ms. Guiberson confirmed on two occasions that he was not. 
(Tr. 4/2/13, p.17, Ls.12-14, p.39, Ls.1-7.) She said "Because I'm there for a home visit, 
he's on parole, and I need to discuss with him what's going on in the home and different 
things like that. So he just can't walk away from a contact." (Tr. 4/2/13, p.17, Ls.15-18.) 
Ms. Guiberson also acknowledged that Mr. Christensen's Fifth Amendment rights were 
not waived in any way as a result of his parolee status. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.18, Ls.14-24.) 
When questioned about the policy of advising parolees of their Miranda rights, 
Ms. Guiberson said "I've never in 20-some years advised anyone of their Fifth 
Amendment right." Mr. Christensen's counsel then asked "Is that something that you've 
been instructed by others in the department or just a policy you implement?" 
(Tr. 4/2/13, p.19, Ls.9-11.) Ms. Guiberson replied "It's just - we - you go to an 
offender's home, and they have conditions of parole that they sign. And they know that 
they're supposed to be honest and truthful, meet with their P.O.s, do different things like 
that. So I'm pretty sure that's probably all covered in those parole agreements." 
(Tr. 4/2/13, p.19, Ls.12-17.) Mr. Christensen's counsel again confirmed that none of the 
officers had advised Mr. Christensen on his Miranda rights, or discussed a need to do 
so, and Ms. Guiberson said "There was no reason for that to even come up." 
(Tr. 4/2/13, p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.13.) Mr. Christensen's counsel then asked "Well, isn't it 
a fact that one of the reasons you were there was to get information that could be used 
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against him?" (Tr. 4/2/13, p.20, Ls.14-16.) Ms. Guiberson replied "That is true. That is 
true. But I also asked him if he wanted to speak with me, and he said yes." (Tr. 4/2/13, 
p.20, Ls.17-18.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Guiberson was again asked to discuss the nature of a 
typical home visit and whether she had ever advised a parolee as to his Fifth 
Amendment rights on such a visit. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.30, L.24 - p.33, L.16.) Ms. Guiberson 
then said: 
When I'm doing a home visit. And I should probably clarify that. Because 
there have been times - I guess if I answer the question right, that I have 
spoken someone [sic] their rights, if I find a major violation, like if there's a 
- I found like three pounds of methamphetamine in the trunk of a car one 
time. And I told the gal, you know, you do need to understand your rights. 
Because with that amount of drugs, I just wanted to make sure that -- that 
she understood. Because I wasn't even questioning her on it. 
(Tr. 4/2/13, p.33, L.17 - p.34, L.2.) 
Trooper Skinner also testified. He said before he went in to question 
Mr. Christensen, he put on a vest that had "Police" emblazoned on it. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.48, 
Ls.1-10.) And he confirmed that Mr. Christensen was not free to leave when they all 
entered the home. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.48, Ls.12-14.) Trooper Skinner explained that when 
he and Detective Olson first entered the home, they started searching the residence, 
but he soon joined Ms. Guiberson when she informed him that Mr. Christensen 
indicated he was willing to talk to them. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.53, L.15 - p.55, L.3.) 
Mr. Christensen was arrested and later entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine; that plea preserved 
his ability to challenge the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. 
(Tr. 8/26/13, p.74, L.18 - p.75, L.2.) Subsequently, the district court imposed a unified 
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sentence of five years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.176-179.) Mr. Christensen then 
filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.185-
188.) He also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, but that 
motion was denied by the district court. (R., pp.182-183.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it held that Mr. Christensen was not entitled to a Miranda 
warning and denied his motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Held That Mr. Christensen Was Not Entitled To A 
Miranda Warning And Denied Mr. Christensen's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Christensen's motion to suppress 
statements made in response to questioning by law enforcement officers and evidence 
discovered in the home because he was not given Miranda warnings prior to being 
questioned while he was in custody. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated 
standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. ·J 998). The Court accepts the 
trial court's determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews 
"the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. 
C. Because A Parolee Enjoys Far Fewer Freedoms Than A Probationer, Or Any 
Other Citizen, The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Christensen's Motion 
To Suppress 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides "No person ... 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. 
CONST. AMEND. V. Similarly, the Idaho Constitution provides, "No person shall ... be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " ID. CONST. ART. I, 
SEC. 13. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that "the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 
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of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966). The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. (footnote omitted). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated that, "[e]ven though a person is not formally arrested, 'the 
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom 
of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest."' State v. Munoz, 149 
Idaho 121, 128-29 (2010) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420,440 (1984)). 'The 'custody' test is an objective one; it is not based on the 
subjective impressions in the minds of either the defendant or the law enforcement 
officer." State v. Massee, 132 Idaho 163, 165 (Ct. App. 1998). "[T]he only relevant 
inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his 
situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. 
Therefore, courts employ a totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether a defendant was in custody at the time he was questioned. State v. James, 
148 Idaho 57 4, 577 (2010). Here, it was error for the district court to hold that 
Mr. Christensen was not in custody because it relied on precedent that did not involve 
the questioning of parolees. (See R., pp.90-93.) Instead, the district court should have 
looked specifically at how a "reasonable parolee" would have understood his situation. 
In denying Mr. Christensen's suppression motion, the district court found that his 
situation was similar to that in Massee, which involved a probationer. There, 
Mr. Massee's probation officer (Mr. Peace) went to Mr. Massee's residence for a home 
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visit after Mr. Massee had tested positive for methamphetamine. Massee, 132 Idaho at 
164. During the visit, Mr. Peace noticed a shotgun shell on the kitchen table and later 
found a shotgun. Id. He then called for backup "to conduct a more thorough search of 
the residence." Id. However, before backup arrived, Mr. Massee admitted that his 
grandfather had given him the gun. Id. Shortly thereafter, when a sheriff's detective 
came to the home, Mr. Massee told him the same thing. Id. At no point prior to this 
time was Mr. Massee advised as to his Fifth Amendment rights, nor was he handcuffed. 
Id. He was later arrested and charged with felon in possession of a firearm. Id. He 
filed a motion to suppress, but the district court held that he was not in custody and 
denied the motion. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that because there was 
no "evidence of overbearing interrogation," Mr. Massee was not in custody. Id. at 165-
66. 
By contrast, here, five officers arrived at Mr. Christensen's home at the same 
time, and at least three of them entered his home right away. 2 (Tr. 4/2/13, p.22, L.17, 
p.44, Ls.13-16, p.47, Ls.14-18.) Also, Ms. Guiberson immediately used an "interview 
tactic" when she told Mr. Christensen that the woman who had left the residence told 
them he had sold her methamphetamine. (Tr. 4/2/13, p.22, Ls.17-25 - p.23, Ls.1-8.) 
Ms. Guiberson also made it clear to Mr. Christensen that he was going to be arrested 
for something that day - either simple possession or delivery - depending on his 
2 It is not clear from the record that all of the officers present entered the home, but 
Ms. Guiberson's testimony makes it sound as though they were all in the home at one 
time or another. At one point, she was asked whether any other officer questioned 
Mr. Christensen, and she said, "Um, I'm not sure. I know that Detective Skinner and I 
did most of the questioning. We were standing in the kitchen. If someone else came 
and asked him a random question, I'm not sure about that." (Tr. 4/2/13, p.28, Ls17-22.) 
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willingness to cooperate. 3 (Tr. 4/2/13, p.23, Ls. 15-19.) Nevertheless, the district court 
found that, based on some similarities to the facts of Massee, "a reasonable person in 
Mr. Christensen's circumstance would not have felt his freedom of action was curtailed 
to the degree associated with a formal arrest." (R., p.90-92.) In fact, Mr. Christensen's 
circumstance, and more importantly his status as a parolee surrounded by numerous 
officers, quite reasonably made him feel that he was in custody. 
The district court should have considered that Mr. Christensen's status as a 
parolee changed the entire equation. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court pointed 
out that a parolee "remains in the legal custody' of the department of corrections 
through the remainder of his term.4 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 851 (2006) 
(emphasis added). It also said that "parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation 
is to imprisonment, and parole is simply "an established variation on imprisonment of 
convicted criminals." Id. at 850 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S 471, 477 (1972)). 
Therefore, Massee is distinguishable from this case, not only because there were many 
3 The district court acknowledged that Ms. Guiberson "informed Christensen that new 
charges would be filed," but the district court found that this "did not turn the encounter 
into a formal arrest that would trigger the Miranda safeguards." (R., p.94.) In support of 
this, the district court relied on State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577-78, for the 
proposition that an officer's "statement of his future conduct cannot be said to 
objectively change the degree of restraint at the time of the statement." (emphasis in 
original). However, the James Court also said that "the threat of lawful arrest alone 
does not transform non-custodial questioning into the functional equivalent of arrest, 
requiring Miranda warnings." Id. at 578 (emphasis added). This implies that when such 
a threat is viewed in conjunction with other circumstances, it is a factor to be used in 
determining whether a defendant was in custody at the time of questioning. 
4 The Samson Court was discussing the language of the California penal code, but 
Idaho's statute regarding parole uses the same language. I.C. § 20-223 states a 
prisoner "may be allowed to go upon parole but to remain while on parole in the legal 
custody and under the control of the board and subject to be taken back into 
confinement at the direction of the commission." 
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more officers involved here, but because Mr. Massee was on probation while 
Mr. Christensen was on parole. 
The district court also found similarities between this case and State v. Young, 
136 Idaho 711 (Ct App. 2002). In Young, the district court held that Mr. Young was in 
custody. Id. at 718. But the Court of Appeals reversed and held that he was not in 
custody because there was a valid search warrant for the property and "a person 
detained during execution of a search warrant is generally not in custody." Id. 
Therefore, the district court here said that because Mr. Christensen waived his Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure rights, his detention during a search of his home was 
"analogous to the detention of a defendant during the search of a home pursuant to a 
validly executed search warrant." (R., p.91.) But this ignored the fact that 
Mr. Christensen was on parole. He was not an average citizen whose home was 
searched subject to a search warrant. 
Further, the Young court held that Mr. Young was not in custody because the 
officers did not draw their weapons; no threat of force was used; Mr. Young was not 
handcuffed; and the questioning of Mr. Young was limited in scope and duration.5 Id. at 
721. Again, these factors do not have the same bearing on Mr. Christensen's situation 
because he was a parolee, and no reasonable parolee would have felt free to terminate 
this interrogation and leave. Confronted by his parole agent and at least two other law 
enforcement officers, the prospect of an imminent arrest, and questioning that went on 
for up to an hour, any reasonable parolee would not feel free to leave and would 
consider himself in custody. 
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In short, for a parolee, no guns, handcuffs, or threats are necessary in order to 
find that the parolee was in custody; parolees are essentially in custody from the 
moment they start their parole, and would face the immediate prospect of prison if they 
chose to leave a situation such as this. Ms. Guiberson confirmed this when she said 
that, as a parolee, Mr. Christensen could not "walk away from a contact" with her. 
(Tr. 4/2/13, p.17, Ls.15-18.) Furthermore, there is no reason why a parolee should not 
be read his Miranda rights if he is suspected to be in violation and will be questioned 
about that violation. Parole agents like Ms. Guiberson should not have the power to 
arbitrarily decide when reading a parolee those rights is appropriate; it is certainly not 
her role to determine when a parolee commits a "major violation," which would require 
her to advise him of his Miranda rights. ( See Tr. 4/2/13, p.33, L.17 - p.34, L.2.) The 
United States Supreme Court's discussion of the definition and parameters of parole 
makes it clear that Mr. Christensen's status as a parolee made his interrogation 
custodial. Therefore, when he was questioned about a crime that potentially constituted 
a violation of his parole, he should have been advised as to his Miranda rights 
immediately. 
5 There is no specific time indicated, but the Appellant's brief stated it lasted for "several 
minutes" only. Id. at 721. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Christensen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
order of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to 
suppress. 
DATED this 24th day of December, 2014. 
ff.L REED P. ANDERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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